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Mark D. Christiansen
Crowe & Dunlevy
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
Courts in the oil and gas-producing states have alw ays experienced at least
some level of litigation over the scope and nature of payments owing to royalty owners in
co n n e ctio n w ith oil and gas production and operations. However, in recent years, the
nu m be r of law suits over royalty paym ent issues has reached an unprecedented level.
M ost of the m ore-recent royalty ow ner actions (1) seek to claim a share of gas contract
litig a tio n settlem ents between lessees and gas purchasers, (2) object to the action of
lessees in taking into account certain “post-production” and m arketing-related expenses
in determ ining the value, price or proceeds upon w hich gas royalty paym ents are
determined, (3) object to the use of “posted prices” in calculating the paym ents to royalty
owners for crude oil production, or (4) challenge certain m arketing transactions between
producer-lessees and the ir affiliated entities. In asserting these types of claims, royalty
owner counsel have increasingly attem pted to use class action procedure, as opposed to
lim iting the law suit to the claim s of their own individual clients.

A.

POST-PRODUCTION COST LITIGATION.

O ver the years, the courts in the oil and gas-producing states have in a
num ber of cases addressed the extent to w hich a lessee may deduct from royalty
payments a proportionate share of “post-production” and marketing-related expenses (e.g.,
gas gathering, transportation, compression, dehydration and blending costs). The lessee
typically does not seek to have the royalty ow ner pre-pay these expenses out of pocket;
rather, lessees usually ask only that they be permitted to take those expenses into account
in calculating the value, price or proceeds upon w hich the royalty paym ents are to be
based. During the latter 1980's and throughout the 1990's, dram atic changes in the gas
industry and gas marketing business have changed the way in which many lessees market
gas production.
Lessees have increasingly incurred major expenses (expenses
tra d itio n a lly borne by the gas purchaser) in attem pting to obtain better, higher-priced

markets for gas production than the markets available in the vicinity of the well. Lessees
argue that such activities go above and beyond their duties under the oil and gas lease,
and that it is appropriate to take the expenses incurred in connection with those activities
into account in calculating gas royalty payments. On the other hand, a number of royalty
owners have argued that their royalty payments should not take into account any portion
of those expenses. These conflicting positions have led to a number of recent lawsuits
addressing the extent to which lessees may pass on to royalty owners a proportionate
share of expenses incurred in connection with the marketing of gas production in the new
industry environment. Some of the recent cases which have addressed this issue are
described below:
1.

Garman v. Conoco Inc., 886 P.2d 652 (Colo. 1994).

In this case, the Supreme Court of Colorado addressed the following question
certified from a Federal Court in Colorado: "Under Colorado law, is the owner of an
overriding royalty interest in gas production required to bear a proportionate share of postproduction costs, such as processing, transportation, and compression, when the
assignment creating the overriding royalty interest is silent as to how post-production costs
are to be borne?" Under the facts presented, the court found that the implied covenant to
market obligated the lessee to incur those post-production costs which were found to be
necessary to place the gas produced from the subject property in a condition acceptable
for market. The court further found that the overriding royalty interest owners were not
obligated to bear a share of those costs.
The court in Garman stated that its ruling was limited to those post-production
costs which were required to transform raw gas into a marketable product. "Upon
obtaining a marketable product, any additional costs incurred to enhance the value of the
marketable g a s ... may be charged against nonworking interest owners. To the extent that
certain processing costs enhance the value of an already marketable product the burden
should be placed upon the lessee to show such costs are reasonable, and that actual
royalty revenues increase in proportion with the costs assessed against the nonworking
interest." (Emphasis supplied by the court) 886 P.2d at 661.
2.

TXO Production Corp. v. Commissioners of the Land Office, 903 P.2d 259
(Okla. 1994) _______________________________________________________

In this case, the lessee under an oil and gas lease covering State lands
brought an action for declaratory judgment to determine w hether it could deduct from
royalty payments to the State a proportionate share of certain post-production costs. The
royalty clause in the State oil and gas lease provided that TXO would deliver or cause to
be delivered to the Commissioners “without cost into pipelines,” an agreed fraction "of the
oil or gas produced from the leased premises and [the agreed fraction] of all casinghead
or drip gas or gasoline or other hydrocarbon substances produced from any well or wells
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on said premises, or in lieu thereof, pay to [the Commissioners] the market value thereof,
as the Comm issioners may elect." The Commissioners elected to receive their royalty
under the "market value" alternative. W hen TXO made royalty payments to the
Commissioners, it deducted a portion of the proceeds to cover the Commissioners' share
of gas compression, dehydration and gathering expenses. The Comm issioners asserted
that such expenses should not have been deducted from their royalty payments. In
interpreting the above-quoted royalty clause, the court found that the language "without
cost into pipelines" modified both the "in kind" and "market value" royalty alternatives
provided for in the lease.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court stated that, in Oklahoma, the lessee's duty
to market involves obtaining a marketable product. The court found that, under the
particular facts presented in this case, the costs for compression, dehydration and
gathering could not be charged to the Commissioners because those processes were
necessary to make the product marketable. 903 P.2d at 262-263. However, the court
made a specific point of stating that it was not disturbing its prior ruling in Johnson v.
Jernigan, 475 P.2d 396 (Okla. 1970), which held, among other things, that the royalty
ow ner is required to bear its proportionate share of transportation costs when the sale
occurs off the leased premises.
3.

Sternberger v. Marathon Oil Company. 894 P.2d 788 (Kan. 1995).

This was a multistate class action lawsuit, involving oil and gas leases
covering lands in Kansas, Oklahoma and Texas. TXO (predecessor in interest to
Marathon) had deducted from its gas royalty payments certain "marketing costs" or
"ga the ring line am ortization expenses" in order to recover a portion of the expenses it
incurred in constructing and maintaining gas gathering pipeline systems to transport the
gas from the leases to markets off the lease. The gas royalty provision which governed
the claims of all class members provided that TXO would pay as gas royalty a specified
fra ctio n “at the market price at the well (but, as to gas sold by lessee, in no event more
than [the agreed fraction] of the proceeds received by lessee from such sales), for the gas
sold used off the premises, or in the manufacture of products therefrom ..." There was no
market for gas at the wellhead, and TXO had been unable to induce a gas purchaser to
construct a pipeline to the wells. Consequently, TXO laid its own gas gathering pipeline
system to transport gas from the wells to the market. TXO then deducted from royalty
payments a "line am ortization charge" to recover a proportionate share of the cost of the
pipeline. The court noted that, as to some properties, the line am ortization charges were
designed to recoup a proportionate share of the costs in one year (at which point the
deductions would cease). As to other properties, the charges were to continue throughout
the life of the well.
The Kansas Supreme Court held that the lessee has the duty to produce a
marketable product, and that the lessee alone bears the expense of making the gas

-3-

marketable. However, in Sternberger, the court found that there was no evidence that the
gas produced by Marathon was not marketable at the mouth of the well (other than the lack
of a purchaser at that location). The court noted that there was no evidence that Marathon
had engaged in any activity designed to enhance the product, such as compression,
processing or dehydration. Moreover, there was no evidence that Marathon attempted to
deduct any expenses in making the gas marketable other than those of constructing a
pipeline to transport the gas to the purchaser or to a transmission pipeline. (The court
found that the deductions made by Marathon were properly characterized as
"transportation" rather than as "gathering" or production costs.) Consequently, the Kansas
Supreme Court held that, under Kansas law, the royalty owners were responsible for their
proportionate shares of the reasonable expenses of transporting the gas from the wellhead
to market, and that Marathon could properly deduct a proportionate share of those
expenses from the royalties. 894 P.2d at 799-800. The court found that Oklahoma and
Texas law sim ilarly allowed the same deductions.
4.

Judice v. Mewbourne Oil Company. 939 S.W .2d 133 (Tex. 1996).

T h e question in this case was whether post-production com pression costs
could be allocated to royalty owners under the terms of certain oil and gas leases and
division orders. The court made a number of findings too numerous to recite in this paper.
As to those oil and gas leases which provided that royalty was to be based on the “market
value [of the gas] at the well,” the court held that the lease meant that royalty was to be paid
based on the “value at the well, net of any value added by compressing the gas after it
leaves the w ellhead.” 939 S.W .2d at 135.
The court also reviewed two forms of division orders. The first form provided
that settlement “for gas sold shall be based on the gross proceeds realized at the well by
you. For gas used off the leases, settlement shall be based on market value at the w ell.”
The second form of division order provided that payments for gas was to be made “based
on the net proceeds realized at the well by you," following this language, the following
bracketed words in the division order form were deleted: [after deducting any costs incurred
in compressing, treating, transporting and/or dehydrating the gas for delivery. If the gas
is processed in or near the field where produced, settlement shall be based on the net
proceeds realized at the well, as determined by the agreement between the producer and
processor, or, in the absence of such an agreement, the same basis as settlement with
other producers of gas of like kind and quality processed at the same plant. For gas used
off the lease, settlement shall be based on market value at the well.] Most of the gas
produced under each of the leases was sold off the leased premises to a third party
purchaser.
As to the first form of division order, the court found that the term “gross
proceeds” means that the royalty is to be based on the gross price received by the lessee,
and that the use of the term “at the well” indicates just the opposite— that royalty was to be
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based on the value of the gas at the well. Thus, the court concluded that there was an
inherent conflict in the use of the two terms in the division order language w hich rendered
the clau se in the first form am biguous, and that the trial court did not err in entering
judgment in favor of the royalty owners on the first form of division order. As to the second
form o f division order, the court held that the trial court erred in holding fo r the royalty
ow ners. The appellate court noted that the division order unam biguously provided that
royalty was to be based on “net proceeds at the well.” The term “net proceeds” was found
to expressly contemplate deductions, and that the phrase “at the w ell” meant before value
was added by preparing the gas for market. The court held that the handw ritten deletions
in the division order did not alter the effect of the rem aining language.
5.

H eritage Resources. Inc. v. N ationsbank, 939 S.W .2d 118 (Tex. 1996)

Nationsbank sued Heritage contending that Heritage deducted transportation
costs from the value of its royalty in violation of the oil and gas leases. The court made a
number of rulings and observations in this case, including the follow ing: (1) It found that
the low er court had erroneously construed a royalty clause w hich provided for payment
based on market value at the well to mean that royalty was to be based on the market value
at the point of sale with no deductions for post-production costs. The court rejected the
notion that the lessee was required to pay royalties based on the market value at the point
of sale. (2) The oil and gas leases in this case provided that royalty was to be based on
the m arket value at the well, and contained additional language stating as follows:
“provided, however, that there shall be no deductions from the value of Lessor’s royalty
by reason of any required processing, cost of dehydration, com pression, transportation,
or other matter to m arket such gas.” W ith regard to this special language, the court held
that the “value of the lessor’s royalty” was the market value at the well, m ultiplied by the
applicable royalty fraction. The court found that the clause dealing with post-production
costs simply specified that there could be no deduction from the value of the lessor’s royalty
by reason of any post-production costs. The court reversed the trial court’s ruling in favor
of the royalty owner.
6.

XAE Corporation v. SMR Property Management Co., No. 87,466, Oklahoma
Court of Appeals (D ivision No. I) (Opinion dated January 14, 1997, Appeal
Pending).___________________________________________________________

In XAE C orporation v. SMR Property M anagem ent Company, the plaintiffs
w ere owners of overriding royalty interests under instrum ents w hich provided that the
overriding royalty was “to be delivered . . . free and clear of all costs and expenses
whatsoever, save and except gross production taxes or other governm ental taxes properly
chargeable thereto.” Gas produced from the subject w ells was delivered to a plant where
carbon dioxide, hydrogen sulfide and w ater were extracted, and the gas was com pressed
to meet the specifications for delivery into a major pipeline. The overriding royalty interest
ow ners sued to recover the am ount of deductions for gathering, delivery and treatm ent
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charges. The Oklahoma Court of Appeals concluded that the overriding royalty owners
in this case should be treated essentially the same as royalty owners with respect to the
litigated issue. The court found that the lessee was obligated to incur the expenses in
question in order to make the gas a “marketable product,” and that the lessee should alone
bear all of those expenses, and therefore held for the override owners.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has granted discretionary review of this case,
which frequently indicates that the court is going to reverse or significantly modify the
decision under review. The parties are currently awaiting a decision from the higher court.
7.

Schroeder v. Terra Energy. Ltd.. 565 N.W.2d 887 (Mich. App. 1997).

The plaintiffs, royalty owners of Terra, alleged that Terra had paid them
royalties without based on the “gross proceeds” of gas sales, without deducting
postproduction costs, for about two years. Terra then advised that it would deduct
postproduction costs in the future and would also reduce future revenues in recoup past
overpayments. The royalty clause of the applicable lease provided that gas royalties would
be paid based upon “gross proceeds at the wellhead.” Terra argued that the valuation of
the gas should occur at the wellhead and that, in the absence of any market at the
wellhead, such valuation must take into consideration the postproduction costs necessary
to prepare the gas for its ultimate market. The royalty owners argued that the gas should
be valued for royalty purposes where the market for the gas exists and that there was no
need to reduce the sales price by postproduction costs.
The court held that, in determining “gross proceeds at the wellhead,” in the
absence of an actual sale of gas at the wellhead resulting in ascertainable gross proceeds,
the gross proceeds from the sale of gas elsewhere must be extrapolated, backwards or
forwards, to reflect appropriate adjustments due to differences in the location, quality, or
characteristics of what is being sold. Here, gas was sold 30 miles from the wellhead. At
that point the gas sold had been altered, both by being transported to a point at which a
large buyer was willing to accept the production from a relatively small leasehold, and by
being processed to eliminate impurities so the purchaser could put the commodity directly
to its intended end uses. The court found that these enhancements were the result of effort
and monetary expenditures by the lessee, which expenses were properly deducted from
the price received at the point of sale to determine the gross proceeds at the wellhead. The
court rejected the royalty owner’s argument that the lack of explicit language in the oil and
gas lease allocating post-production costs meant that such costs were not deductible, noting
that the lease provision in question was a standard provision reflecting customary practices
in the industry. The court found that, while the royalty provision could have been clearer,
it was nevertheless sufficiently unambiguous. The court also rejected the argument that
the lessee was estopped from beginning such deductions by virtue of its conduct in non
making such deductions for some two years.

B.

ROYALTY OWNER CLAIMS TO A SHARE OF GAS CONTRACT LITIGATION
SETTLEMENTS.___________________________________________________

During the 1980’s, many producers filed, or threatened to file, suits against
gas purchasers alleging that the purchasers had failed to comply with the terms and
provisions of applicable gas purchase contracts. Many of these suits alleged that the
purchaser breached the “take-or-pay” provisions of the gas purchase contracts. Many
producers settled these claims by entering into settlement agreements, the terms of which
would vary on a case-to-case basis. Some of those settlements involved an agreement
on the part of the gas purchaser to make a stipulated cash payment in consideration for
the release of the claims for prior breaches of the gas contract. Some of those settlements
also involved an agreement under which the producer would stipulate to the termination
of the disputed gas purchase contract.
For a number of years, royalty owners have been attempting to claim a share
of the sums received by producers under such gas contract settlements. Many of the cases
on this issue have favored the producer and have held that the payments received under
those settlements were not royalty-bearing. See, e.g., Mandell v. Hamman Oil and Refining
Co., 822 S.W.2d 153, 165 (Tex. App. Houston 1991) (“Production is the key to royalty. .
. Royalty does not accrue until gas is produced, that is, physically severed from the soil.
. .” ); Gerard J.W. Bos. & Co. Inc. v. Harkins & Co., 883 F.2d 379, 382 (5th Cir. 1989)
(holding that, under Mississippi law, the royalty owner was a mere incidental beneficiary
and had no rights under the gas purchase contract); Wyoming v. Pennzoil Co., 752 P.2d
975, 980 (Wyo. 1988) (“The language of the lease, considered in its entirety, demonstrates
that the intention of the parties was that royalty payments would be due only after the gas
was sold or used, and no sale could be identified unless the gas was severed from the
leased land.”); Diamond Shamrock Exploration Corp. v. Hodel, 853 F.2d 1159, 1168 (5th
Cir. 1988) (royalty is not due on take-or-pay payment unless and until there is “actual
physical severance of minerals from the formation”); Killam Oil Co. v. Bruni, 806 S.W.2d
264, 268 (Tex. App. San Antonio 1991, writ denied) (under a standard lease, take-or-pay
payments do not constitute any part of the price paid for produced g a s ... These payments
are made when gas is not produced, and as such, bear no royalty.”); Hurd Enterprises, Ltd.
v. Bruni, 828 S.W.2d 101, 110 (Tex. App. San Antonio 1992) (Footnote 12: “Because takeor-pay provisions are intended to apportion the risks of natural gas production, it follows
that the benefits from those provisions should not be shared by royalty owners.”).
More recently, while most of the court decisions have favored producers, some
courts have held in favor of the royalty owners. The decisions in certain states which have
favored the position of royalty owners resulted in a significant increase in the number of
lawsuits filed with respect to this issue during the 1994-1995 time frame. Some of the more
recent and/or currently-pending decisions in this area include the following:
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1.

Roye Realty & Developing, Inc. v. Watson, No. 76,848,1996 W L 515794,___
P.2d
. Oklahoma Supreme Court (Opinion issued Septem ber 10, 1996)

In this case, the lessee had entered into the settlem ent of a gas contract
lawsuit. The royalty owners contended that, by virtue of the failure to pay to the royalty
owners a share of the sums received by the lessee in connection with that settlement, the
lessee had breached the oil and gas leases, had violated 52 O.S. 1991, §540(a), and had
breached a fiduciary duty which was alleged to be owing by the lessee to the royalty
owners. The royalty owners also alleged that they were third party beneficiaries under the
gas purchase contract and/or under the settlement agreement. In the course o f discovery,
the lessee refused to produce for the royalty owners a copy of the settlem ent agreement.
The royalty owners filed a motion asking the court to compel the lessee to produce a copy
of the settlem ent agreement. The lessee and gas purchaser argued that the settlem ent
agreement was not relevant to any claim by the royalty owners, and moved fo r summary
judgment in their favor. The trial court denied the motion to compel and entered summary
judgment in favor of the producer and gas purchaser, finding that the sums received under
the settlem ent were not subject to royalty claims.
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and ruled in favor of
the royalty owners. W hile the decision of the court cites no prior cases or legal authority,
the court stated that the “take-or-pay” arrangem ent was simply a “m arketing substitute or
alternative to severance and sale.” The court further stated that “by receiving paym ent
either for the severance and taking of oil and gas by a purchaser or fo r granting a right to
refuse to take oil and gas that the purchaser was obliged to take, the lessee m arkets the
oil and gas. The lessee also incurs liability to pay the lessor a royalty on the revenue
generated from such m arketing.” The court held that the royalty owners w ere entitled to
a royalty share of “any payments received in connection with the marketing of gas that was
subject to the production capability of [the lessee]. This includes take or pay paym ents or
a settlement of take or pay liability. . . .” Since the applicable settlem ent agreem ent was
not part of the record before the trial court, the Court of Appeals made this ruling w ithout
reviewing the terms of the settlem ent agreement.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court then granted discretionary review, reversed
the ruling of the Oklahoma Court of Appeals, reinstated the trial court ruling and held for
the lessee. The court held that the terms of the oil and gas lease decided the issue. Under
the language of the lease the W atsons were only entitled to royalties on gas produced,
saved and sold from the premises. Take-or-pay payments were not made for gas produced
and sold, so no royalty was owing on such payments. The court further held that the royalty
owners were not third party beneficiaries of the gas purchase contract, and were not entitled
to share in the take-or-pay settlem ent under that alternative theory.
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2.

Harvey E. Yates Co. v. Powell. 98 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 1996).

HEYCO, the lessee under oil and gas leases covering lands owned by the
State of New Mexico, entered into settlem ents with El Paso and Transw estern resolving
a lle g e d breaches of gas purchase contracts. Certain of the settlem ent paym ents were
made in exchange for price and take reduction am endments to the gas contracts. Based
on the contract amendments, HEYCO was paid the generally prevailing m arket price of its
gas, which was a price substantially lower than the prior contract rate. The Com m issioner
of state lands asserted that the state should pay royalties on the proceeds of the settlem ent
and alleged claims for (1) breach of the duty to market and breach of the duty of good faith
and fa ir dealing; (2) constructive sale of gas; (3) breach of the duty to pay royalties; (4)
unjust enrichm ent; and (5) third party beneficiary.
The Tenth Circuit held that, under the oil and gas leases at issue in the case,
the lessee need only pay the lessor as royalty one-eighth of the cash value of the gas
produced and saved from the leased premises. That is, the lessee is not obligated to pay
a royalty on the cash value of the gas in the abstract, but only on the cash value of gas
w hich is actually produced and saved from the leased property. The Tenth Circuit
recognized three “guiding principles” that were applicable to the issue in this case: First,
ro ya lty paym ents are not due under a “production” type lease unless and until gas is
physically extracted from the leased premises. Second, nonrecoupable proceeds received
by a lesse e in settlem ent of the take-or-pay provision of a gas supply contract are
specifically for “non-production” and, thus, are not royalty-bearing. Third, any portion of a
settlement payment that is a buy-down of the contract price for gas that is actually produced
and taken by the settling purchaser is subject to the lessor’s royalty interest at the time of
such production, but only in an am ount reflecting a fa ir apportionm ent o f the price
adjustment payment over the purchases affected by such price adjustment. The court also
declined to adopt the “cooperative venture” or “ H arrell” rule, finding that the cases which
have applied that rule are states w hich have unique statutes w hich expand the definition
of royalty, and that the rule has received little support from other states. The court
concluded that the lessee’s duty to pay royalty on that portion of a settlem ent which is
attributable to future price reductions is not triggered until that future production is actually
taken by the gas purchaser who made the settlem ent payment.
3.

Klein v. Arkom a Production Company. 73 F.3d 779 (8th Cir. 1996V

This case was an appeal of the remanded proceedings w hich occurred after
the Eighth Circuit's earlier ruling in Klein v. Jones, 980 F.2d 521 (8th Cir. 1992). The issue
before the court was w hether royalty owners were entitled to share in any portion of the
$173 million that two individuals received from various transactions. The court found that
the royalty owners were entitled to a fractional royalty share of the portion of the cash sum
which was found to represent a "prem ium " paid by the gas purchaser in order to obtain a
fa v o ra b le m odification to a gas purchase contract. The court stated that the implied
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covenant to market under Arkansas law included a duty to share the proceeds of gas
m arketing decisions with the lessors. The court further found that since the evidence
showed that the defendants had settled a take-or-pay claim, and had failed to share it with
the royalty owners as they were required to do under Arkansas law, the royalty owners were
entitled to judgm ent on their claim for unjust enrichment.
The district court had found that the actions of Arkoma in reform ing the gas
contract were prudent and reasonable. Klein v. Arkoma Production Co., No. 90-2060, Mem.
Opn. at 46 (W.D. Ark. Jan. 5,1994). The Eighth Circuit held that, w hile the district court’s
finding may be correct, the court has misperceived the issue. It held that the implied
covenant to market under a lease necessarily encompasses not only the duty to make
prudent and reasonable business decisions, but the duty to share the proceeds of those
decisions with the lessors. The court found that the breach in this case was neither the
decision to settle the claims against the gas purchaser nor the decision to reform the gas
contract; rather, the breach of the implied covenant to market was the failure to share the
benefits of the settlement with the beneficial owners of those proceeds.
4.

W atts v. Atlantic Richfield C o., 115 F.3d 785 (10th Cir. 1997).

In Watts v. Atlantic Richfield Company, the mineral owner-lessors under some
40 oil and gas leases sued ARCO seeking recovery for alleged unpaid gas royalties under
six separate legal theories: (1) Breach of contractual duty to pay royalties, (2) breach of the
implied covenant to market, breach of fiduciary duty, (4) constructive fraud, (5) breach of
duty of good faith, and (6) civil conspiracy. The claims were related to the fact that ARCO
had entered into a settlement of certain gas contract claims with its gas purchaser, but did
not pay any share of the sums it received under that settlement to the mineral owners. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of ARCO, finding, among other things, (1)
that the oil and gas leases at issue in the case did not provide fo r royalties to be paid on
sums received in connection with gas contract settlements, and (2) that none of the sums
received by ARCO in connection with the settlement constituted payment for the production
and sale of gas, and were thus not royalty bearing.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the district court,
and remanded the case for further proceedings, stating: (1) that each of the subject oil and
gas leases required royalties to be paid only on the proceeds from the sale of gas actually
produced from the wells; (2) that, in determining whether royalties w ere owed on the sums
received by ARCO under the gas contract settlement, the relevant question is w hether or
not the funds making up the payment actually pay for any gas severed from the ground;
(3) that nonrecoupable sums received by the lessee in settlement of take-or-pay gas
contract claims are specifically not for production and are, therefore, not royalty bearing;
and (4) that sums paid to buy-down (reduce) the contract price paid for gas that is actually
produced and taken by the settling gas purchaser is subject to the lessor’s royalty interest
at the time of production, but only in an amount reflecting a fair apportionm ent of the price
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adjustm ent paym ent over the purchases affected by such price adjustm ent. A t the time
this paper was submitted for reproduction, the Tenth C ircuit had not yet ruled on A R C O ’s
Petition fo r R ehearing.
5.

Johns Hopkins Hospital v. Peabody Coal Company, No. 92-64, United States
D istrict Court fo r the W estern District of Kentucky (M arch 21. 1996).______

This case involved the rights of the lessor under a coal lease. The lessee and
a coal p u rch a se r reached an agreem ent fo r the purchaser to buy-out the existing coal
supply agreement. The lessee released the purchaser from the remaining two years of the
coal supply agreem ent in exchange fo r the paym ent o f $17.5 m illion. The lessee then
entered into two new coal supply agreem ents with reduced volum e requirem ents and, on
one of the two agreements, a substantially reduced selling price fo r the coal. The lessee
did not pay any royalties to the lessor with respect to the paym ent received under the
settlem ent agreem ent.
The court noted that there was nothing in the coal lease obligating the lessee
to pay royalties when it received consideration for anything other than the severance of coal
from the lessor's property. Rather, royalties w ere owed only in the event that actual
production - the severance of coal -- occurred. Thus, the court held that the settlem ent
paym ent did not trig g e r any royalty obligations.
6.

Transam erican Natural Gas Corporation v. Finkelstein, 933 S.W .2d 591 (Tex.
App. - San Antonio. 1996).____________________________________________

This case involved a claim by an overriding royalty interest ow ner to a share
o f the sum s received by his lessee in connection with a gas contract settlem ent. The
statement of facts set forth w ith respect to this case reveals a series of unusual facts and
events which appear to have contributed to the initial panel decision of the Texas Court of
A ppe als. The two largest elem ents of the gas contract settlem ent at issue in this case
included take-or-pay damages and repudiation dam ages for the rem ainder o f the contract
term.
In the initial decision which, the court stated, addressed an issue not
previously decided by the Texas Court of Appeals, the court found that the overriding royalty
interest ow ner w as entitled to recover a share of the settlem ent sums paid in connection
with the gas contract settlem ent. The court noted that if the ow ner was to be paid on the
full price effectively received for the gas produced and sold during the repudiation period,
the royalty should be calculated not only on the basis of the spot m arket price received by
the lessee after the term ination of the contract, but also, to some extent, on the basis of
the repudiation damages. U nder the particular circum stances presented in this case, the
court found that, once the purchaser’s m ake-up right was term inated by the cancellation
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of the gas contract, the settlem ent proceeds relating to the repudiation dam ages had the
practical effect of increasing the price paid fo r the gas w hich was actually produced.
On August 14, 1996, the Texas C ourt of A ppeals granted TransA m erican’s
M otion fo r R ehearing en banc, it w ithdrew the earlier opinion and it substituted a new
opinion in its place. In the new opinion, the court held, am ong other things: (1) T h at the
overriding royalty ow ner was not entitled to a share of the take-or-pay and contract
repudiation settlement sums; (2) that the language of the governing conveyance documents
which described the paym ents w hich the overriding royalty ow ner w as entitled to receive
were limited to payments for gas actually extracted from the land; (3) that both settlem ent
components involved payments for non-production; (4) that take-or-pay paym ents are not
a benefit flowing from the implied m arketing covenant under an oil and gas lease; (5) that
the monies received under the settlement did not have the effect of increasing the price paid
for gas that w as taken from the property; (6) that, even if the gas purchaser w as allow ed
a “credit” for gas the lessee sold on the spot m arket in m itigation of its alleged repudiation
dam ages, this did not change the nature of the settlem ent as the com prom ise of a
dedication claim that existed independently of the lease; (7) that the lessee did not receive
an unfair w in d fa ll by refusing to pay royalty; and (8) that, with respect to the p la in tiff’s
proposed distinction between “take-or-pay” damages and “contract repudiation” damages,
the court considered that “a breach is a breach,” and that both form s of paym ents are fo r
gas not taken or paid for under the gas purchase agreement. Consequently, the court held
tha t TransA m erican w as not required to share the proceeds of its settlem ent w ith the
overriding royalty owner.
7.

Independent Petroleum Association of America v. Babbitt, 92 F.3d 1248 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) ___________________________________________________________

This case involved a dispute over whether lump-sum paym ents m ade by gas
pipelines to lessees to settle large take-or-pay liabilities accrued under long-term gas
purchase contracts are properly subject to royalties under federal oil and gas leases. The
settlem ent agreem ent in question agreed to a com plete buy out o f the gas contract,
terminating the contract in exchange for a nonrecoupable and nonrefundable cash payment.
The D epartm ent of the Interior (DOI) argued (1) that the paym ent w as royalty-bearing,
contending that the parties to a buy out arrangement know that subsequent production will
be sold at lower prices and that the lessee-producer will not obtain the same price as under
the original contract; (2) that a lump-sum payment to buy out the obligation to take required
volumes at higher prices compensates the lessee in some degree for the reduced price the
lessee w ould receive w hen the gas is later produced and delivered; (3) that the fact that
a substitute purchaser, instead of the original purchaser, was involved in the buy out
situation should not change the result—the benefit to the lessee w as the sam e regardless
of the identity of the party taking delivery of the gas. The DOI contended that the paym ent
was therefore attributable to the volum es of gas later taken and becam e part of the total
amount paid to the lessee fo r that production.
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The court described the issue as being one of whether it was arbitrary and
capricious for the DOI to conclude that take-or-pay settlement payments are royalty bearing
in light of its determination [following the case of Diamond Shamrock Exploration Co. v.
Hodel, 853 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1988)] that take-or-pay payments themselves are not royalty
bearing until those payments are specifically allocated to gas that is physically severed from
the ground. The court concluded that the DOI had failed to give a sufficient non-arbitrary
reason for treating the two types of payments differently. “Under Diamond Shamrock’s
construction of the royalties statute as requiring a link between payments subject to royalty
and the physical severance of gas, there is no meaningful distinction between a settlement
payment and a recoupable take-or-pay payment in that no gas is actually produced in either
case. But unlike the recoupable take-or-pay payment, a nonrecoupable settlement payment
is never credited as payment for any gas actually severed from the ground. W hen gas is
actually severed and sold to a substitute purchaser, the settlement payment does not serve
as payment for the gas. The link between the funds on which royalties are claimed and
the actual production of gas is missing.” 92 F.3d at 1259-60. The court concluded that
neither take-or-pay payments nor take-or-pay settlement payments are royalty bearing
unless and until they are credited toward the purchase of make-up gas.
8.

Alameda Corporation v. Transamerican Natural Gas Corporation, 950 S.W.2d
93 (Tex. App. - Houston. 1997V_____________________________________

Alameda, a royalty owner, brought suit against its lessee seeking a share of
the proceeds received by the lessee under a gas contract litigation settlement. Alameda
asserted the theories of unjust enrichment and breach of the duty to reasonably market the
gas. At the conclusion of the trial, judgment was entered in favor of the lessee and against
Alameda. Alameda appealed, arguing that the bulk of the settlement payments was not
for take-or-pay damages but for the gas purchaser’s repudiation of the gas purchase
agreement. Because the gas purchaser relinquished its make-up rights as part of the
settlement, Alameda argued that it was as though the gas had been produced, delivered,
taken and paid for, thereby making the payment subject to royalty. The court further
considered the contention that a settlement which provides for the gas purchaser’s
relinquishment of its right to recoup gas paid for but not taken (1) has the practical effect
of increasing the price paid for gas actually produced, (2) creates a windfall for the producer,
and (3) deprives the royalty owner of a subsequent opportunity to share in the lump sum
payment when the paid for, but not produced, gas is later produced and sold at less than
the contract price.
The appellate court affirmed the ruling against the royalty owner, holding as
follows: (1) The court agreed with the court’s analysis in TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp.
v. Finkelstein, 933 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. App. - San Antonio, 1996). Alameda’s royalty interest
was tied to production, and the settlement payment in this case was not made for
production. (2) The court specifically declined to follow the so-called “Harrell Rule,” or
cooperative venture theory, described in Klein v. Arkoma Production Co., 73 F.3d 779 (8th
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Cir. 1996), stating that such theory is derived from unique state statutes that expand the
definition of “royalty,” and that the theory has not received much additional support from
other courts. (3) The court observed that the lessee’s duty to m arket pertains to the
“production” of gas. Because no gas was produced to El Paso, the settlem ent proceeds
could not constitute damages for breach of the m arketing covenant. The court found that,
absent “production” under the El Paso gas contract, the lessee’s duty to m arket was not
triggered as a matter of law.
9.

In re Century Offshore Management C orp., 111 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 1997),

Century was the lessee under federal oil and gas leases. The MMS sought
to recover royalties on a lump sum payment which the gas purchaser made to the lessee
to terminate gas contracts and replace them with new contracts based on current, floating
market prices. The court concluded that “the transaction, viewed as a whole, was clearly
linked to gas ‘production saved, removed or sold,’ and that royalties w ere therefore owing
on the lump sum payment. The court stated that an up-front payment made in exchange
for a substituted gas contract that changes the price of the old contract, follow ed by new
gas purchases, was sufficient to trigger royalty obligations under the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356.
10.

Condra v. Quinoco Petroleum, Inc., 954 S.W.2d 68 (Tex. App. -- San Antonio,
1997),______________________________________________________________

The lessees under the subject oil and gas leases entered into a settlem ent
of claims against the gas purchaser for breach of a gas purchase contract. The purchaser
was required to pay the lessees a recoupable payment and a nonrecoupable payment.
The recoupable payment was a prepayment for gas to be delivered in the future. The
nonrecoupable payment was consideration for certain am endm ents to the gas purchase
contract and settlem ent of other claims, one of which was the purchaser’s alleged failure
to take rateably from the lessees’ wells. The gas contract was am ended to delete the
favorable price provisions and insert market or spot pricing, elim inate the take-or-pay
obligation, and extend the term of the agreement for an additional three years. O verriding
royalty interest owners under the leases brought suit claim ing a share of the settlem ent
payments.
The court held that in favor of the lessees, finding in part as follows: (1) The
nonrecoupable paym ent was not paid for production, so the overriding royalty interest
owners were not entitled to be paid a share of that sum. (2) W ith respect to the issue of
whether the implied covenant to market can be breached by the settlem ent of a claim for
breach of the take-or-pay provisions in a gas purchase contract, the court held that the duty
to reasonably market is not triggered in the absence of production. Thus, since the
settlement payments were paid in the absence of production, the duty to m arket was not
breached.
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11.

Helmerich & Payne, Inc. v. State of Oklahoma, ex rel. Commissioners of the
Land Office. 935 P.2d 1179 (Okla. 1997) ____________________________

While the captioned case did not involve a gas contract litigation settlement,
the issues in the case are of related interest. In this case, the plaintiffs were lessees under
oil and gas leases covering state lands. The lessees had sold gas under gas contracts
which provided that the purchaser would reimburse the lessees for gross production and
petroleum excise taxes paid to the state in connection with the gas sold under those
contracts. The Commissioners of the Land Office (CLO) demanded that the lessees pay
additional royalties to the state based on the reimbursement amounts paid by the gas
purchaser for those state severance taxes. The lessees denied that any royalties were
owing on those payments, and the lessees brought an action against the CLO seeking a
declaratory judgment to that effect. In the course of the litigation, the CLO contended that
the tax reimbursement payments represented additional value paid by the purchaser for
the gas production. The CLO further argued that the regulations governing state oil and
gas leases defined the price for purposes of computing gas royalties as the “value received
under the sale contract” or “gross proceeds” received under the sale contract (the royalty
clause of the state’s form of oil and gas lease referred to payment on the basis of “market
value”).
The court concluded that the CLO was not entitled to additional royalty based
upon the gas purchaser’s tax payments because the royalty clauses in the leases, even
as augmented by the aforementioned regulations, did not require it. The court held that
the term “market value,” as used in the royalty clauses of the state oil and gas leases,
meant the gas purchase contract price. The contracts established a price in the form of
a cash payment per mcf of gas. That was the price upon which the CLO’s royalty was to
be calculated. The court found that the regulations relied upon by the CLO were general
and tried to be all encompassing, but could not be stretched to include royalty on the gas
purchaser’s tax payments.

C.

ROYALTY OWNER LAWSUITS OVER TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN LESSEES
AND AFFILIATED ENTITIES._________________________________________

As indicated earlier, significant changes have occurred throughout the late
1980s and 1990s in the way in which lessee-producers market natural gas. Some of the
larger gas producers now have affiliated companies which engage in the purchase and sale
of natural gas production from both the affiliated producer and third party gas producers.
Where a lessee has sold gas from a well to an affiliated gas purchaser, some royalty owners
have alleged that the price paid by the affiliated entity is not a fair price upon which to base
royalty payments. While few lawsuits have been filed in this area (when compared with the
other types of issues discussed above), the issue of affiliate marketing transactions has
received some attention in the courthouse.
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One of the cases in this area which has received significant attention in the
industry is the case of Caroline Altheide, e t al., v. Meridian Oil, Inc., e t al., No. 14-95-00619CV, in the Fourteenth Court of Appeals, Houston, Texas. In this case, the plaintiffs allege
that Meridian improperly calculated settlement prices paid to royalty owners, overriding
royalty owners and working interest owners when gas or gas liquids were sold or gathered
by affiliated companies. The plaintiffs have asserted causes of action for breach of implied
contractual duties, breach of express contract (leases, operating agreements and division
orders), breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent misrepresentation, tortious interference, and
breach of alleged duty of good faith and fair dealing. The defendants deny the allegations
and assert, among other things, that the plaintiffs' claims are barred by (1) the express
terms of written oil and gas leases, operating agreements, unit agreements, contracts and
division orders applicable to each plaintiff; (2) the applicable statutes of limitations; and (3)
ratification, waiver and estoppel.
The district court certified this case as a "class action" lawsuit. According to
the briefs that have been filed, the certification order certified a nationwide class of
approximately 35,000 diverse royalty, overriding royalty and working interest owners with
respect to virtually all gas production of the defendants in 22 states over a nine-year time
period. The defendants have appealed that certification order, and that appeal is currently
pending before the Texas Court of Appeals. The defendants contend, among other things,
that the trial court approved an unprecedented “class” in a case involving breach of contract
and fraud claims for underpayment of royalties, which will require individualized proof and
separate trials or jury findings regarding contractual rights, reliance and limitations with
respect to each of the 35,000 class members. The defendants assert that the class
certification order will render the case unmanageable, and that it should be reversed. A
settlement of this case is the subject of a pending appeal.
For a discussion of the judicial treatment of certain aspects of transactions
between oil and gas producers and affiliated entities, see, e.g., Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v.
Hagen, 683 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. App. - Texarkana 1984), affirmed in part and reversed in part,
31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 140 (Tex. 1987),Judgment and opinion o f the Supreme Court withdrawn,
judgment of the Court o f Appeals set aside, motion for rehearing and cause dismissed as
moot, 760 S.W.2d 960 (Tex. 1988); Parker v. TXO Production Corp., 716 S.W.2d 644 (Tex.
App. - Corpus Christi 1986); Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 571 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. App. Houston 1978); Amoco Production Company v. First Baptist Church o f Pyote, 579 S.W.2d
280 (Tex. App. - El Paso 1979); Tara Petroleum Corporation v. Hughey, 630 P.2d 1269
(Okla. 1981); Young v. West Edmond Hunton Lime Unit, 275 P.2d 304 (Okla. 1954); True
Oil Company v. Sinclair Oil Corporation, 771 P.2d 781 (Wyo. 1989); and Coosewoon v.
Meridian Oil Co., 25 F.3d 920 (10th Cir. 1994).
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D.

“ POSTED PRICE” CRUDE OIL LITIGATION.

Beginning in the summer of 1995, a series of lawsuits have been filed in
various states which are generally based upon the allegations that crude oil has been sold
from producing oil wells based upon “posted prices,” that royalty owners have been paid
(in whole or in part) based upon those “posted prices,” and that “posted prices” allegedly
do not represent fair value for the crude oil production. The claims and theories of relief,
as well as the supporting factual allegations, vary between certain of these cases. W hile
not an exhaustive list, some of the cases filed on this general subject are as follows:
1.

Texas General Land Office, et al. v. Amoco Production Company, et al., No.
95-08680, In the District Court of Travis County, Texas, 345th Judicial District
(Filed July 14, 1995) ______________________________________________

The Plaintiffs state in their Petition that they propose to bring a class action
lawsuit on behalf of “those persons to whom the defendants have made royalty or overriding
royalty payments, calculated by the defendants on the basis of ‘posted prices’ for crude oil.”
The Plaintiffs contend that the Defendants’ prior payment practices with respect to oil
production (1) breached contractual obligations alleged to be owing to the Plaintiffs under
oil and gas leases and division orders, (2) breached an alleged implied duty on the part of
the Defendants to market crude oil with due diligence and to obtain the best price
reasonably possible, (3) breached the Defendants’ alleged statutory duties as lessees of
the Texas General Land Office, (4) breached the Defendants’ alleged duty to act reasonably
and in good faith under the Uniform Commercial Code, and (5) obligated the Defendants
to render an accounting to the proposed class members with respect to the amounts
allegedly owed to them.
2.

Texas General Land Office, et al. v. Union Pacific Resources Company, No.
954-241. In the District Court of Fayette County. Texas. 155th Judicial District.

The Plaintiffs state in their Petition that they propose to bring this action on
behalf of the persons “to whom UPRC has made royalty or overriding royalty payments for
producing properties in Texas on the basis of prices below those prices that UPRC and
[Union Pacific Fuels, Inc.] achieve in arms-length transactions.” The Plaintiffs contend that
the prior payment practices of the Defendant with respect to oil production (1) breached
contractual obligations alleged to be owing to the Plaintiffs under oil and gas leases and
division orders, (2) breached an alleged implied duty on the part of the Defendant to market
crude oil with due diligence and to obtain the highest attainable price, (3) violated the
D efendant’s alleged statutory duty as a lessee of the Texas General Land Office, (4)
violated an alleged duty on the part of the Defendant under the Uniform Commercial Code
to act reasonably and in good faith, and (5) obligated the Defendant to render an accounting
to the proposed class members with respect to the amounts allegedly owed to them.
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3.

State of Texas, Lee County, et al. v. Amerada Hess Corporation, et al., No.
10,652, In the District Court of Lee County, Texas, 21st Judicial District (Filed
August 31, 1995).___________________________________________________

The Plaintiffs state in their Petition that they propose to bring this action on
behalf of “all those owners of royalty interests, overriding royalty interests, working interests
or other interests to whom any of the defendants have made payments for oil or gas.” The
Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants are common carriers and/or common purchasers of
crude oil and condensate and/or natural gas and the natural gas liquids contained therein,
and that the Defendants are under statutory duties not to discrim inate in the purchasing,
taking, gathering, transportation or sale of oil or gas. The Plaintiffs further allege that the
Defendants have violated their statutory duties not to discriminate by buying and/or selling
oil attributable to the members of the proposed Plaintiff class at prices alleged to be lower
than actual market prices (based on so-called “posted prices”), w hile at the same time
allegedly realizing higher prices and values for their own production of oil produced in the
same fields. The Plaintiffs contend that the prior payment practices of the Defendants with
respect to oil production (1) violated statutory duties allegedly owing under Section 111.261
of the Texas Natural Resources Code, (2) violated statutory duties allegedly owing under
Section 111.262 of the Texas Natural Resources Code, (3) violated statutory duties
allegedly owing under Section 111.263 of the Texas Natural Resources Code, and (4)
obligated the Defendants to render an accounting to the proposed class members.
4.

Carl Engwall, et al. v. Amerada Hess Corporation, Case No. CV-95-322, In
the Fifth Judicial District Court of Chaves County, New Mexico (Filed
September 1, 1995).________________________________________________

The Plaintiffs state in their Complaint that they propose to bring this action
on behalf of a class of “all other persons to whom Defendants have underpaid royalty or
overriding royalty payments on crude oil during the period January 1, 1986, to date.” The
Plaintiffs contend that the prior payment practices of the Defendants with respect to oil
production (1) violated contractual duties alleged to be owing to the Plaintiffs under oil and
gas leases and other agreements, in an intentional, reckless and wanton manner, (2)
breached an alleged implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in the marketing of crude
oil for fair market value and in the payment of royalties and overriding royalties to the
proposed class, and violated an alleged duty to obtain the best price reasonably available
for production, (3) obligated the Defendants to render an accounting to the proposed class
members of the amounts allegedly owed to them, (4) constituted unfair or unconscionable
trade practices under the New Mexico Unfair Trade Practices Act, and (5) violated the duties
allegedly owing by the Defendants under the New Mexico Oil and Gas Proceeds Payment
Act.
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5.

Laura J. Kershaw, et al. v. Amoco Production Company, et al., No. CJ-95184, In the District Court of Seminole County, Oklahoma (Filed September
13, 1995)._________________________________________________________

The Plaintiffs state in their Petition that they propose to bring this case as a
class action lawsuit on behalf of “those persons to whom the defendants have made royalty
or overriding royalty payments, calculated by the defendants on the basis of ‘posted’ prices
fo r crude oil.” The Plaintiffs contend that the Defendants’ prior payment practices with
respect to oil production (1) breached the contractual obligations alleged to be owing to the
Plaintiffs under oil and gas leases and division orders, (2) breached an alleged implied duty
on the part of the Defendants to market crude oil with due diligence and to obtain the best
price reasonably possible, (3) breached a duty allegedly owing by the Defendants under
the Uniform Commercial Code to act reasonably and in good faith, and (4) obligated the
Defendants to render an accounting to the proposed class members with respect to the
amounts allegedly owed to them.
6.

The Mcmahon Foundation, et al. v. Amerada Hess Corporation, et al., No.
H -96-1155, United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas,
Houston Division (Filed April 10, 1996)._______________________________

The Plaintiffs state in their Complaint that they propose to bring this action
on behalf of a class of “all owners of Direct Payee Royalty Interests and W orking Interests
who were paid or credited by virtue of Lease Production Oil produced and first sold to one
or more Defendants or Affiliate Traders from a mineral lease at or by reference to posted
price at any time since September 30, 1986." The Plaintiffs allege a com bination and
conspiracy among the Defendants to fix, depress, stabilize and maintain at artificially low
levels the prices paid for the first purchase of Lease Production Oil sold from leases in
which the proposed class members own interests. The Plaintiffs allege violations of the
Sherman Act §1. (The capitalized terms are defined in the Complaint.)
7.

Cameron Parish School Board, et al. v. Texaco, Inc., et al., No. 10-14264,
Before the 38th Judicial District Court. Parish of Cameron. Louisiana.

The Plaintiffs state in their Petition that they propose to bring this action on
behalf of a class of "all other persons, entities, and public bodies to whom defendants have
underpaid royalties on crude oil and condensate during the period from January 1, 1986
to date." The Plaintiffs contend that the prior payment practices of the Defendants with
respect to oil production (1) breached contractual obligations alleged to be owing to the
Plaintiffs under oil and gas leases, (2) breached an alleged implied duty to act in good faith,
to act as a prudent operator and to use due diligence in marketing crude oil for the best and
highest price reasonably obtainable, (3) allegedly constituted unfair methods of competition
and unfair and deceptive trade practices under the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and
Consumer Protection Law, (4) violated duties allegedly owing under the Louisiana Mineral
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Code (R.S. 31:1, et seq.), (5) allegedly constituted fraud under the Louisiana Civil Code
Article 1953, (6) allegedly constituted a wrongful conversion of royalties belonging to the
Plaintiffs, and (7) obligated the Defendants to render an accounting to the proposed class
members.
8.

Jerry Kelly, et al., v. Exxon Corporation, No. CV-96- , In the C ircuit Court of
Santa Rosa County. Florida._________________________________________

The Plaintiffs state in their Complaint that they propose to bring a class action
lawsuit on behalf of "all individuals and entities who have in the past or are now receiving
royalties and/or overriding royalty payments from crude oil production in those parts of the
Jay Oil Field located in Santa Rosa County, Florida." The Plaintiffs contend that the
Defendants' prior payment practices with respect to oil production (1) breached contractual
obligations alleged to be owing to the Plaintiffs under leases and other agreements, (2)
breached alleged implied duties on the part of the Defendants to act in good faith and with
fair dealings, to market crude oil with due diligence for the best and highest price reasonably
obtainable, to act as prudent operators, and to pay the full amount of royalties and
overriding royalties due to the Plaintiffs from the sale of oil, (3) breached the Defendants'
alleged fiduciary obligations under leases and other obligations, (4) violated alleged
contractual, statutory and common law duties to the Plaintiffs to disclose on each check
the actual value received by the Defendants for the crude oil, thereby leading to claims for
fraud, misrepresentations and deceit, (5) w rongfully and intentionally converted royalties
and overriding royalties alleged to be the property of the Plaintiffs, and (6) obligated the
Defendants to render an accounting to the proposed class members with respect to the
amounts allegedly owed to them.
Professor Conine of the University of Houston Law Center has written a recent
article analyzing many of the issues raised in the crude oil royalty litigation. See Gary B.
Conine, “Crude Oil Royalty Valuation: The Growing Controversy Over Posted Prices and
Market Value,” 43 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Instit. 18-1 (1997).
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